We examine the impact of the May 2003 dividend tax cut and managerial stock holdings on corporate dividend initiation decision. We find that managers who hold sizable stakes in their companies are more likely to initiate dividends following this tax cut. This positive relation is stronger for firms with higher growth opportunities. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that managers initiate dividends to maximize their own wealth. Moreover, the market reacts negatively (most positively) to dividend initiation announcements by firms with higher (lower) growth opportunities and higher (lower) managerial share holdings.
One explanation for this increased number of dividend initiations could be that firms wish to reward shareholders. Although all shareholders benefit from higher dividends at the lower tax rate, the rewards are also lucrative for senior executives who hold sizable stakes in their companies. For example, Lester May, chairman of Clear Channel Communications Inc, received additional $1.1 million after the company announced its first dividend in 2003. This example provides anecdotal evidence of the direct benefit that senior executives receive due to large share holdings after the tax cut.
What we do in this study is to test if managers tend to initiate dividends when they can receive more benefits from the dividend initiation at the lower tax rate. We argue that when dividend income is subject to a higher tax rate than capital gains, managers have less incentive to pay out dividends. Managers can create "home-made" dividends by selling some of their shares, and this method provides better tax efficiency for managers. But after the tax cut, the dividends and capital gains are taxed at the same rate. Although home-made dividends are still more tax efficient, this tax cut greatly reduces the tax disadvantage associated with issuing dividends.
Furthermore, managers might prefer dividends for several other reasons, particularly when compared to capital gains. Dividends may provide much less uncertainty in terms of how much cash managers can realize. Therefore, even when dividends are subject to higher tax rate, some managers may consider dividends as a better way of distributing firm's profits for their own benefits. Their preference for dividend income and for raising dividends will be much greater after the dividend tax cut, since managers receive substantially larger after-tax income under the new tax system.
Once dividends are raised, corporations rarely reduce this level. This stability means that managers can add another stable source of income, along with their cash compensation.
Again, at the lower dividend tax rate, we should find that the managerial incentive of initiating dividends is much greater when they prefer more stable income. Therefore, the tax cut in 2003 provides a unique opportunity to examine our managerial incentive hypothesis that managers' equity holdings impact their decisions to initiate dividends.
We focus on managerial stock holdings because the incremental after-tax benefit depends mainly on the total number of shares. Managers who hold sizable stakes in their companies have a strong incentive to increase dividends as a way to maximize their own wealth. Thus, the question that we ask here is whether managers direct their corporations to modify dividend payment decisions for their own benefits. We use two proxies for managers' stock portfolio, the log of the total number of shares held by CEOs and by top executives, respectively.
We find that managerial stock holdings have a significant, positive effect on the likelihood of dividend initialization in year 2003. However, we find no such relation before 2003. Similar to previous studies, we find that managerial stock options are negatively related to dividend initialization both before and after the dividend tax cut.
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We next investigate the claim that after the tax cut, firms switch from stock repurchase payouts to dividend payouts. The empirical evidence supports this claim. Our results
show that the ratio of dividend over total payout is positively related to managerial stock holdings. This relation provides additional support for our hypothesis that stock holdings motivate managers to pay more dividends.
However, initializing dividends as a way of maximizing managers' own wealth may or may not be at the expense of shareholders' wealth, because both managers and shareholders can benefit from higher dividends at the lower tax rate. To further investigate managerial incentives to initiate dividends, we first examine the concurrent effect of growth opportunities with managerial shareholdings on firm's dividend initiation decision. Because external financing is costly, firms with higher growth opportunities are expected to retain more earnings for future investment. If managers act in the best interests of shareholders, they will be less likely to initiate dividends when the firm has higher growth opportunities. On the other hand, if managers were to maximize their own wealth, they will induce firms with growth opportunities to initiate dividends.
Secondly, we study the market reaction around announcement dates of new dividend initiation by firms with different levels of growth opportunities and managerial shareholdings. As shown by Asquith and Mullins (1983) and Healy and Palepu (1988) , the market reactions to dividend initiation announcements are positive. However, when dividend initiation is announced by firms with high growth opportunities and high managerial shareholdings, the market may view such dividend initiations as driven by managerial incentives. Therefore these companies are expected to have less positive, or even negative, announcement effects.
We find stronger relation between managerial share holdings and dividend initiations for firms having higher growth opportunities. This result holds even after we control for the ownership of individual shareholders. We also find that the market reacts negatively to dividend initiation announcements by firms with both higher growth opportunities and managerial share holdings. However, market reacts most positively to dividend initiation announcements by firms with both lower growth opportunities and shareholdings. These results provide further evidence of our hypothesis that managers tend to maximize their own wealth by initializing dividend at the lower dividend tax environment.
Our work is related to other studies that investigate corporate payout policy with managerial stock incentives. Weisbenner (2000) and Fenn and Liang (2001) investigate the effect of employee or management stock options on a firm's decision to increase dividends and/or repurchase stocks. They find a positive association of stock options and stock repurchase. Rozeff (1982) and Fenn and Liang (2001) The paper is organized as follows: Section I describes the sample and variables used in our tests. Section II presents the results of the tests. Section III concludes.
I. Data Extraction and Method
We obtain data on stocks and options held by chief executive officers (CEOs) and other top executives from the Compustat Execucomp database, and extract firm characteristics from the Compustat annual database. We extract dividend data from the CRSP database. We exclude utility firms because they are heavily regulated. We also We perform logistic regressions to estimate the likelihood of a firm initiating dividends. The dependent variable is a dummy variable that is equal to one if a firm pays a dividend for the first time, and zero otherwise. Proxies we use for managerial stock incentives are the log of total number of shares held by CEOs (LSHRCEO) and top executives (LSHRALL) respectively. We focus on managerial stock holdings because the after-tax benefit for managers depends mainly on the total number of shares. Managerial ownership, which is defined as the percentage of shares owned by managers, has less effect on the after-tax benefit managers receive from dividend initiation or increase.
As to control variables for option holdings, we use LOPTCEO and LOPTALL, which are logarithms of total number of options held by CEOs and top executives, respectively. We include managerial option holdings because options are not dividendprotected and give managers a disincentive to increase dividends. DEBT is the ratio of a firm's long-term debt to total assets as of fiscal year-end 2002. We include DEBT as a proxy for an alternative mechanism to constrain managers. LSIZE is the log of the sum of the book value of debt and preferred stock plus the market value of common equity as of fiscal year-end 2002. We include LSIZE as a proxy for financing costs. MKTBK is the ratio of the market value of the firm's assets to the book value of assets as of fiscal year-end 2002. MKTBK is our proxy for investment opportunities. NETCF is the net operating cash flows divided by total assets; and serves as a proxy for free cash flow.
CASH is the cash plus short-term investment scaled by total assets. CASH is a proxy for assets available to pay dividends.
The model we use in the logistic regression estimation of the likelihood of dividend initialization is:
We also investigate the dividend payout as a percentage of firm total payout in our sample. To construct the total dollar payout of stock repurchase, we follow the approach used by Stephens and Weisbach (1998) . We count the monthly decrease in shares outstanding from CRSP as shares repurchased by the firm. To derive the dollar amount of repurchase, we first multiply the number of shares repurchased by the average of stock prices at the beginning and end of the month, 3 and then accumulate over 12 months gives us the dollar amount that the firm spends on repurchase. This method of calculating repurchase underestimates the repurchase, but the other way of using
Compustat data item 115 overstates the repurchase.
To obtain the total dollar dividend payout, we multiply each dividend payment by the corresponding outstanding shares of the frim from the CRSP monthly files and accumulate them over a year. We choose these methods of computing repurchase and For the sample of prior years, both CEOs and top executives for non-dividendinitiating firms hold more shares of both stock and stock options, relative to executives in dividend-initiating firms. We note that option holdings by CEOs and top executives for non-dividend initiating firms are significantly greater than for executives of dividendinitiating firms. This result suggests that when managers hold more stock options, they tend not to initiate dividends because of the negative relation between the value of stock options and dividends. 
II. Empirical Results

A. Univariate tests
B. Multivariate tests
The univariate results in the previous section provide partial evidence of an association between managerial stock holdings and dividend initiation. However, this effect may only capture systematic variations in the firms' financial characteristics (such as firm size, the level of cash flows, or firm's growth opportunities) that are the true drivers of dividend initialization. We address this possibility by extending our analysis to a multivariate framework. By including control variables for these characteristics, we capture the direct marginal effect of managerial stock holdings on firm's dividend increases after dividend tax cut. We examine whether the likelihood of dividend initiation is associated with increased levels of managerial stock holdings after the dividend tax cut in May 2003.
We estimate logistic regressions to distinguish among the possible explanations for dividend initialization. Table IV provides variables, a one standard deviation change of LSHRCEO will increase the probability of initiating dividends by 0.025. In comparison, the probability of initiating dividends at the median values is 0.048 and the largest marginal effect of one standard deviation change is NETCF, which stands at 0.05.
However, there is no statistically significant association between CEOs' stock holdings and dividend initialization during the periods prior to the dividend tax cut. But for the full sample period (1993 through 2003) , the interaction dummy variable has a coefficient of 0.119, which is statistically significant at the 5% level. These results suggest that managers are more likely to initiate dividends when they hold a sizable number of shares and their dividend incomes are taxed at the lower rate. The results based on top executives also provide the supporting evidence of our hypothesis.
LSHRALL is positively associated with the likelihood of dividend initialization for year 2003, and is statistically significant at the 5% level. Also, the interaction dummy variable
shows that the marginal effect of managerial stock holdings on firm's dividend initialization after the tax cut is significant and positive. Before the dividend tax cut, managerial stock holdings had virtually no effect on dividend initiation.
We find that both CEOs' and top executives' stock options are negatively related to the likelihood of dividend initialization for all three different sample periods. This result is consistent with the hypothesis suggested by Lambert, Lannen, and Larker After the tax cut, personal stock holdings may motivate managers to use dividend as a preferred method of payout.
The coefficients of option holdings are all negative and statistically significant.
This result is consistent with the fact that options are not dividend-protected and that they provide a negative incentive for dividend payout. The other coefficients are consistent with early results from logistic regressions. Size and net cash flows have positive effects on dividend payout ratio. Debt, market-to-book ratio, and cash holding have negative effects on dividend payout ratio.
C. Ownership of individual investors
One argument is that, managers increase dividend after dividend tax cut as a way to maximize shareholders' wealth. That is, managers find it more beneficial to raise dividend for shareholders. Along this line of view, Blouin, Raedy, and Shackelford (2003) find the evidence that dividend increase is positively associated with the level of individual shareholder ownership. However, after further review of dividend changes, they conclude that this positive correlation is mainly driven by largest special dividends for a few firms.
To check whether managers initiate or increase dividends to benefit all individual shareholders or only to themselves after the tax cut, we include individual shareholder ownership, INDOWN, in our regressions for 2003. We define INDOWN as one minus the sum of institutional holdings divided by total shares outstanding. 4 We include this variable to control for the effect of shareholder ownership on corporate dividend policy. show that when they initiate dividends after the tax cut, managers are more concerned about their own benefits rather than shareholders'.
D. More evidence on agency motivation for dividend initiation
If a firm has high growth opportunity, it is generally beneficial for the firm not to pay or to pay less dividend because the cash is needed for future investment. If managers initiate dividends to take advantage of low dividend tax for themselves, they may pay less consideration to the growth opportunity of the firm. We further investigate the decision to initiate dividends from two areas. First, we include an interaction variable between managerial stock holdings and an indicator variable for high growth firms. If the coefficient on this interaction is positive, then managers in firms with high growth opportunities are more likely to initiate dividends if they hold more stocks. In this case, the initiation of dividends hurts the company, but benefits managers. Second, we study the market reaction around announcement dates of new dividend initiation. If this initiation of dividends hurts firms with high growth opportunities, we expect to see a negative reaction to these announcement events.
We define high growth firms as firms with Tobin's Q higher than the industry median, where industry is defined as firms with the same two-digit SIC codes. Using this definition, we can classify each firm in our sample as with high growth firm or low growth firm. Then we include the interaction variable between managerial stock holdings and high growth firm in the logistic regressions. Finally, we study the market reaction to the announcement of dividend initiation.
We measure market reaction as the Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) over a three-day window starting from one day before the announcement and ending at one day after the announcement. The abnormal return is calculated as the excess return over the normal return of a stock, where the normal return are calculated using the market model regressions. We estimate the market model using 255 days of stock returns ending 45 days before the event and value-weighted market returns. Table VII reports the summary statistics of the market reaction. For the sample of 54 firms that initiate dividends in 2003, the average market reaction is positive at 0.0057.
But it is not statistically significant. Then we study subsamples by splitting the sample by CEO stock holdings and by market-to-book ratio. When we split the sample into two subsamples by CEO share holdings, we find that the average market reaction to firms with lower (higher) CEO shareholdings is positive (negative). This result suggests that the market likes those firms that initiate dividend not for the benefits of CEO and executives. When we split the sample into two by market-to-book ratios, we again find that the average market reaction to firms with above median market-to-book ratios is negative. 5 When we combine two criteria and split the sample into four groups, the market reaction to dividend initiation announcement is positive to firms with low CEO share-holdings and low market-to-book ratios, and negative to firms with high CEO share-holdings and high market-to-book ratios. The difference between the two subsamples is significant. This suggests that the market recognizes that firms with high managerial stock holdings and high growth opportunities are not initiating dividends for the benefits of shareholders, and thus reacts negatively to these announcement events.
Based on the market reaction to dividend initiation by different firms, we have more evidence that agency consideration explains much of the dividend initiation decision.
III. Conclusion
In this paper we examine the effect of managerial stock holdings on corporate dividend initiation under the new dividend tax environment. We utilize the rare dividend tax rate cut associated with the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003.
The legislation slashed the tax rate on dividends from 38.6% to the top rate of 15%. As the largest tax cut in the dividend tax rate in U.S history, this change seems to have prompted many corporations to initiate their dividends to reward their shareholders.
However, although all shareholders benefit from higher dividends at the lower tax rate, rewards for the senior executives who hold sizable stakes in their companies are considerable. Also, dividend income taxed at the same rate as capital gains can be more attractive for risk-averse managers seeking more stable income. Therefore, their preference for dividend income should be much greater after the dividend tax cut.
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